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Reducing inflation is the only sustainable way to increase the
size of  a country's  financial system and  thus promote  the
economic efficiencies associated with bank financial interme-
diation.  Raising nominal deposit rates to fully offset higher
inflation requires maintaining progressively  higher real deposit
rates.  These real rates can reach unsustainable levels even at
"only" double-digit inflation rates.
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Based on macrofinancial data from 117 develop-  ing execptionally high M1:GDP ratios in six of
ing and industrial countries for the year 1985:  the 18 sample countries).
* Regression analyses indicate that higher in-  *  Deep financial systems typically reflect
flation lowers overall financial depth, whereas  nonmonetary depthi except in the countries of
higher nominal deposit rates raise it.  However,  EMENA, where they reflect monetary depth.
the effects of inflation are more corrosiVe  than
nominal deposit rates are salutary.  Conse-  Although Neal could not determine which factor
quently, raising nominal deposit rates to fully  is responsible, either anomalous macrofinancial
offset higher inflation requires maintaining pro-  behavior or poor data quality (or both) produce
gressively higher real deposit rates. These real  odd results when the data from the Sub-Saharan
rates can reach unsustainable levels even at  region are used in the regression analyses.
"only" double-digit inflation rates.
The appendix lists the following macrofinancial
Analyses of variation indicate that overall  indicators for each of the 117 countries: The
financial depth, nonmonetary financial depth,  ratio of liquid liabilities (of the financial system)
and the weighted real return on financial assets  to GDP - financial depth, the ratio of quasi-
vary systematically across geographical region  liquid liabilities to GDP - nonmonetary depth,
ai'd across per capita income groups (a proxy for  and the ratio of MI to GDP - monetary depth.
wealth or development).  In contrast, monetary  Also listed are:  Per capita income, inflation
de,pth  is broadly similar across both income  rates, and the weighted real return on financial
groups and geographical regions - except  in the  assets (the liquid liabilities of the financial
EMENA region (Europe, the Middle East, and  system).
North Africa), which is unusually deep (reflect-
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1.  This paper examines macro-financal data from one hundred
seventeen developing and industrial countries for the year 1985  (see the
Annex for a country listing). The objective  is to broadly characterize  the
firarxcial  stemst  of these countries using generaly  available data  and to
produce a set of comparative indicators for use in other work in this area.
The analysis reveals that
*  The level of economic development and institutional factors
associated ovith  geographic location are key determinants of the
size of a country's financial system. Other macro-financial
characteristics,  such as the mix between monetary and interest-
bearing financial instruments, also vary systematically  with
region and level of economic development.
*  Inflation negatively influences the overall size of the financial
system.
*  Nominal returns on financial assets positively influence the
overall size of the financial system.
In the preparation  of this paper, the author benefitted  from valuable  discussions  with
Alan Gelb, James Hanson,  Millard  Lon&  Roberto  Rocha,  Alain  Soulard, and D;mitri  Vittas  of
the World  Bank and Warren Coats and Dan Villanueva  of the IMF.2
*  Since the inflation response is quantitatively more negative
than the deposit-rate response is positive, maintaining the size
of the financial  system at high rates of inflation by raising
deposit rates requires sustaining exceptionally  high real deposit
rates.1
Data
2.  Before  proceeding to the data and data sources,  the reader should be
aware of a semantic stumblin3 point of work in the financial area, that is: one
agents asset's are another's liabilities. Thus, depending on the perspective
(i.e., the lender's or the borrower's) or on common usage, financial
instruments may be referred to either as assets or liabilities. Whenever
possible, the term "financial instruments" will be used.  However, to keep
terminology consistent with data sources and common usage, the terns
"asset" and "liability" may used for the same instrument.
3.  The data are predominantly from the World Bank's Economic  and
Social Database  system (BESD),  with per capita income data from the World
Bank  Atlas.  Deposit rate data are supplemented with data from central bank
publications and World Bank  and IMF  staff.  The data cover a subset of
countries identified in the BESD  system as "All Low Income," "All Middle
Income," and "OECD"  countries. The subset consists  of one hundred
seventeen countries. These  were selected strictly on the basis of data
availability  for the year 1985.  The year 1985  was selected  as the best
compromise between currency and availability.2
1  Es"aates discussed  later in the paper suggest that at an inflation  rate of 100%  per
annum, real deposit rates need to be over 200%  pa. to fully  cffset the corrosive  effect  of
inflation on the size of the financial  system. Alternatively,  estimates  suggest that
maintaining 0% real deposit rates in the face  of 100%  inflation  rather than 0% inflation  would
reduce financial  depth to less than half of the 0% inflation  level.
2  Since  the US$  was particularly volatile  during this period, the analysis  of exchange
rates uses the SDR  instead.3
4.  The data include the ratios of the stocks of the following financial
instruments to gross domestic product (GDP):
*  Money-generally the sum of currency held outside of banks
and demand deposits in the commercial  banks, i.e., Ml.
*  Liquid Liabilities of the Financial System-generally  Money,
plus interest bearing liabilities  of the commercial  banks, plus
demand and interest bearing liabilities of the "non-bank'
financial intermediaries (savings  banks, postal savings systems,
finance companies,  etc.)
*  Quasi-Liquid Liabilities of the Financial System-Liquid
Liabilities  net of Money, i.e., interest bearing liabilities.
For any given country, the specific  data definitions used are from the
International  Monetary  Fund's  International Financial Statistics  (IFS,,  . *ich
is the underlying data source. These definitions are embodied in: IFS !e  34,
for Money;  line 551,  for Liquid Liabilities  of the Financial System;  and, where
Liquid Liabilities  are not defined in the IFS, they will be defined as the sum of
Money, line 34, and Quasi-money,  line 35 (i.e., M2). 3 The gross domestic
product (GDP)  data at market prices are from the World Bank International
Economics  Department's  National Accounts Database.  Per capita  income
data  are from  The 1988 Update of the 1987 World Bank Atlas.
5.  In this study, the problem of deflating the financial stocks by she  GDP
flow is handled by taking the arithmetic average of five quarters of stock data
and dividing it by the GDP flow. The five quarters are the 1984-Q4,  1985-Ql,
1985-Q2,  1985-Q3,  and 1985-Q4,  where year refers to the national income
accounting year, which, in some countries, differs from the calendar year.
The five-quarter approach attempts to limit distortions in financial stodcs
introduced by inflation  and seasonality. Specifically,  the last quarter of the
previous year is indluded in the average to further limit inflation bias over
3  Money, quasi liquid  liabilities,  and liquid liabilities  are financial liabilities of
financal institutions  (i.e.,  the central  bank, the commercial  banks, and the "non-bank-
financial  internedaries) and are held as assets by the public.4
and above a four quarter average, which limits inflation and seasonality
biases present In a single observation.
Note:  With a perfectly  steady nominal  growth rate of one hundred
percent  per annum, the four-quarter  average  of 1985-Q4  through
1985-Q4  stocks is 57%  larger than the initial level, whereas the
five-quarter  average of 1984-Q4  through 1985-Q4  stocks  is 46%
larger. In comparison,  the second  quarter  a stock  is 41%  larger
than the initial level, given the same one hundred percent
growth rate.  With a growth rate of twenty-five  percent per
annum, the four-quarter  average is 15%  larger than the initial
level, the five-quarter  average is 12%  larger, and the second
quarter level is 12%  larger. Cearly, the five-quarter  average
more dosely approximates  stocks  in "mid-year"  (second  quarter)
prices than the four-quarter  average. This feature becomes
important at high rates of growth (inflation),  since  the four-
quarter average increasingly  diverges  from the "mid-yeare
stock.
6.  The data also indude the following  key financial prices
Deposit  Rates-generally the nominal rate on term deposits in
commercial banks with maturities between three months and
one year.
*  Inflation Rates-the  rate of change in consumer prices between
the end of 1984  and the end of 1985.
*  Devaluation  Rates-the  rate of change in the local currency-
per-SDR market exchange rate between the end of 1984  and the
end of 1985.
As with the financial stock data, the actual definitions are those used in the
International  Monetary  Fund's  International Financial Statistics,  from
which the data come. These definitions are embodied in: IFS line 601,  for
deposit rates; line 64, for consumer prices;  and line ..aa for SDR  exchange
rates.  As before, end-of-year  refers to the end of the national income
accounting year.5
Basic  Theory
7.  Briefly,  the underlying theory for this analysis goes as follows:
*  The financial system provides intermediation services to an
economy  by coordinating resource flows from surplus economic
units to deficit units, e.g., between savers and investors.
*  Formal financial systems, with their economies in information
processing and risk-pooling,  are generally more effident
intermediaries than informal or traditional systems.
*  Controlling for allocational  efficiency  (i.e., effectiveness  in
selecting the most economically  productive investments), the
size of the formal financial system relative to the scope of
economic activity-financial  depth should be positively related
to economic performance.
*  Formal financial instruments der.ominated in domestic
currency are only one form of wealth; others indude physical
assets and financial instruments denominated in foreign
currencies. Thus, the relative prices of alternative instruments
influence the profile of wealth holdings and, accordingly,  the
depth of the financial system.
*  In a world of imperfect  irnformation,  imperfectly  mobile factors,
and cultural diversity, the profile of wealth holdings can be
expected to vary across geographical  regions and countries.
Thus, in addition to being influenced by the relative price of
other instruments for holding wealth, financial depth can be
influenced by institutional factors, including a cnuntry's overall
level of development.
Methodology
8.  Simple methodologies  are employed for this analysis.  Descriptive
statistics and a few ordinary least-squares  regressions  are used to: i) examine6
the  deterndnants of financial depth and ii) establish an overall quantitative
framework for further investigations in the macro-financial  area.
9.  The data are grouped by per capita income levels and by geographical
regions. The per capita income (PCY)  eroups include: Low, for 1986  PCY
below US$450;  Middle, for PCY  betwc.  JS$450  and US$3,000;  High, for PCY
between US$3,000  and US$7,200;  and A  4anced for PCY above USW  d200.  The
geographical  groups include: Sub-Saharan  Africa;  the Caribbean;  East Asia;
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa;  Latin America; and South Asia. 4
The seventh "geographical" region is the Industrial Countre,s, which
comprise the OECD countries  with PCY  above US$7,200.  These groupings
permit the analysis of the importance of national wealth (or, more generally,
development) and institutional factors associated with geographic location,
such as worker remittances, usury customs, regional markets, etc.
10.  Single equation, ordinary least squares regressions are used to explain
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP  by the weighted real rate of return on
financial  assets, the real rate of devaluation, and per capita income (a proxy
for wealth) as a scale variable. 5 The weighted real rate of return is the
weighted nominal rate of return deflated by the rate of inflation. The
weighted nominal return is formed assuming that all monetary instruments
pay no interest and all non-monetary instruments have an interest rate equal
to the single deposit rate.  The weights are equal to the monetary and non-
monetary shares of total liquid liabilities,  respectively. A second formulation
separates the price variables into inflation, the weighted nominal return, and
the nominal devaluation rate.  This permits the investigation of the separate
influences of the two components of the real return-the  weighted nominal
return and inflation.
4  For  this analysis,  Pakistan  is included  in the South  Asian  group. See the Countries  by
Region  table in the Annex  for a list  of the regional  breakdowns  and per capita  incomie.
5  This specification  of the regressand implicitly  assumes that at any given level of
wealth  and array of prices,  the long-run desired portfolio  mix  between financial,  real, and
foreign  currency  denominated  assets  is independent  of the rate of economic  activity. Given  the
number of factors  which could  inflrence the relationship  between  desired  portfolio  mix  and
activity level, whether or not such neutrality exists is an empirical  question, which this data
set unfortunately  cannot resolve. The  assumption  of neutrality  is maintained  for the sake of
simplicity. Also,  note that with three alternative assets-financial, real, and foreign currency
denominated-two prices  regressors  are required. In this spedfication,  real assets are the
nunme.7
11.  Expectations  are handled in a very simple manner.  Inflation and
devaluation data are, respectively,  the ex-post changes in the consumer price
level and the market exchange  rate from the end of the 1984  to the end of
1985. Since the flnancial stock data are five quarter averages and, thus, more-
or-less mid-year stocks, inflation and devaluation data represent expectations
that are roughly an average  of static expectations  and perfect foresight. Since
deposit rates are the geometric  average of four quarters of ex-post data,
interest rate expectations are assumed to be perfect foresight. Admittedly, the
assumptions behind the expectatiors modeling are overly strong.  However,
in the absence of dearly superior and readily available  price expectations  data,
these assumptions will have to suffice for this analysis.
12.  Regressions  are also run for the ratios of quasi-liquid financial assets to
GDP and MI to GDP, with inflation, the nominal deposit rate, devaluation,
and per capita income as explanatory variables. 6 In addition to illuminating
the determinants of monetary and non-monetary aggregates, these
regressions can shed light on the determinants of the total financial aggregate,
by revealing potentiahy conflicting  influences  upon the constituent parts or
by revealing which component is producing the effect seen in the totaL
13.  To capture institutional and economic  effects  associated with
geographic location,  binary variables are introduced into each of the
regressions representing the seven geographic regions. Admittedly, this a
crude way of modeling such effects. As well, some theft of explanatory power
from per capita income and the financial  price variables can be expected, since
these variables are somewhat correlated with geographical  location.
However, to the extent that countries in the same geographical  region share
institutional and economic  features, introducing regional binary variables is a
simple and useful way of characterizing their influence on financial depth.
6  As with the liquid liabilities  regression,  neutrality of the rate of economic  activity in
the desired long-run portfolio  mix is assumed. Also  note that with four alternative  assets-
monetary,  non-monetaty  finandal, real, and foreign  currency  denominated-three prices  are
required. In this case,  monetary  assets  are the nunieraire.8
14.  Since aU  variables, except the binary ones, are expressed in logarithms,
the coefficient  estimates can be interpreted as elasticities.7  However, the
coefficient  estimates and their statistical significance  must be interpreted with
care, since, econometric problems with specification  and measurement errors
can bias the coefficient  estimates and reduce the power of the T-tests of
statistical significance  for the estimated coefficients. Nevertheless, the sample
is a very large fraction of the underlying population (i.e., nearly aU  non-
COMECON  countries). Accordingly,  the results give a fairly reliable picture of
the relationships between the financial stocks, the financial prices, per capita
income (wealth), and other institutional factors.
Analysis
15.  The following  summary tables present a broad-brush description of the
financial systems in the one hundred seventeen sample countries. To avoid
confusion,  note that deposit rates refer to interest rates on interest bearing
deposits, whereas weighted returns are averages of the return to interest
bearing deposits and the return to non-interest bearing assets. 8
16.  Table i establishes some macro-financial  benchmarks for use in other
studies in the macro-financial  area. Table 1 also highlights the mean
statistic's sensitivity to observations  with large absolute values, by displaying
both the values for the arithmetic means and medians.  Note that the median
per capita income is nearly two thirds smaller than the mean.  In general, the
distortion is not nearly so great; nevertheless,  care should be exercised in
interpreting and comparing means, particularly when large outlyers exist in
small samples.
7  The inflation, deposit, weighted real retum, and devaluation rates are expressed as
price ratios. For example, a twenty percent per annum rate of devaluation is expressed as 1.20,
i.e., the ratio of the exchange rate at the end of 1985 to the exchange rate at the end of 1984.
Accordingly, an increase of one percentage point in the devaluation rate from 20 to 21%
constitutes an increase of only .83 percent for calculations exploiting the elasticity estimates.
8  By assumption, all non-monetary instruments yield the single deposit rate for each
country collected for the study and all monetary instsuments ( i.e., currency and demand
depowits) pay no interest-a  gross, but workable, simplification.9
Table 1
Financial Depth and Financial  Price Indicatows
Arithmetic  Means  and Medians: Full Sample
(rates  in percent  per  annum)
Mean  Median
liquid Liabilities:  GDP  A59  .389
Quasi  Uquid  Libiltes  : GDP  .285  .199
Ml: GDP  .174  .140
Curecy:  GDP  .077  .055
Real  Deposit  Rae  0.1  2.1
Weipmd  RealRenum  4A  -1.8
Inflaton  Rate  22.0  7.7
Devaluatin Rate  vs SDR  28.2  8.4
Rea Devaluation  vs.  SDR$  3.9  2.8
17.  Per  Capita Incomne  USS  3,040  1,130
Means
18.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 display arithmetic means of the financial depth
indicators grouped by region and by income level, respectively. Table 2 and
Table 3 display arithmetic means of financial  prices, also grouped by region
and by income level, respectively. Within the confines  of what simply
comparing means can reveal, these figures and tables offer some quantitative
picture of how key macro-financial  indicators vary across regions and income
levels.
19.  Figure 1 reveals a fair degree of heterogeneity across regions in overall
financial depth (liquid liabilities: GDP) and non-monetary  depth (quasi liquid
liabilities : GDP).  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Souti  ¼-  sia, and Latin America are
financially and non-monetarily "shallow," whereas the Caribbean, East Asia,
Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, and the Industrial Countries are
deep.  Overall financial depth seems to be correlated with per capita inoome  (a
proxy for wealth or development).10
Figure 1
Financial Depth Indicators
Arithmetic Means by Regions
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20.  Figure 1 also reveals a fair degree of homogeneity  across regions in
monetary depth (MI : GDP)  and currency depth (currency: GDP),  with the
exception of the Europe, Middle East and North Africa region, which is
exceptionally  deep in currency and Ml.  The Industrial Countries are also
monetarily deep.
21.  The relative monetary depth of the Industrial Countries is somewhat
surprising.  Conventional wisdom holds that as financial systems become
more sophisticated, the appearance of higher yielding but sufficiently  liquid
alternatives to monetary instruments permits the public to economize on
monetary balancs.  Accordingly,  the Industrial Countries would be expected
to be monetarily shallow rather than deep.  One possible explanation is that
financial development tends to blur the distinctions between banks and non-
bank financial intermediaries and between demand deposits and time and?11
savings deposits. In some countries, this has led to the use of broader
definitions of monetary instruments than those applied in less developed
financial systems.  The inclusion, for example,  of interest-bearing transferable
deposits in mortgage institutions in the monetary aggregate of some of the
Industrial Countries could help account for that group's monetary depth.
Alternatively,  weak competition between banks in rich countries, could skew
the mnix  of financial instruments towards monetary instruments (a low cost
source of bank funds), which, in combination  with the greater overall
financial depth of rich countries,  could produce higher Ml to GDP ratios. 9
22.  Europe, Middle East and North Africa  region's extraordinary currency
and monetary depth displayed in Figure 1 largely reflects  extreme depth in six
Arab and North African countries. 10 In three of these countries: Algeria,
Egypt, and Syria, extensive price controls,  worker remittances,  and financing
of large public sector deficits have combined to leave the public with large
monetary balances that it cannot work down.  In Egypt, this has contributed to
massive holdings of foreign currency deposits, many of which are counted in
the monetary aggregate. In the Arab Republic  of Yemen,  massive imports
relieved the pressure on domestic prices generated by the public sector
deficits. Currency and monetary depth in Jordan and Malta are more
mysterious. Public sector budgets in both countries remained in rough
balance, although remittances were an important source of liquidity in
Jordan.  Both countries employed price and import controls, but neither to an
extent that could adequately explain Jordan's currency to GDP ratios of 35%  or
Malta's 58%.
23.  At the other end of the spectrum, six sample countries: Argentina,
Brazil,  Israel, Mexico,  the Philippines,  and Uruguay had Ml to GDP ratios of
less than 6%. Since,  with exception  of the Philippines, these countries are
among the ten most inflationary countries in the sample, including the most
9  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  and Italy  all have Ml to GDP  ratios  in excess  of 20%  and Ml
to Liquid liabilities  ratios over 35%.  ,apan,  the Netherlands,  and Switzerland have Ml to
GDP  ratios  in excess  of 20%,  but hc.-ve  Ml to GDP  ratios  less than 25%. Ascribing  either
competitive  or definitioaal  causes to the high level  of monetary depth in these  countries  would
require further investigation.
10  For  the foliowing  countries,  the currency  to GDP  and Ml to CDP ratios  are: Algeria,
25%  and 66%;  Egypt,  19%  and 33%;  Jordan,  35%  and 58%;  Malta,  58%  and 67%;  Syria,  34%  and
61%;  and Arab Republic  of Yemen,  62%  and 76%.12
inflationary three, it appears that high inflation motivates the public to
econom!ze  their monetary balances.  With the exceptions  of Israel and
Uruguay, both of which have large foreign currency deposits included in their
overall financial aggregates, these countries are also financially shallow in
comparison to the full-sample mean and the means of their respective
regions.  This shallowness reflects an inflation-induced  flight from the
financial instruments encompassed by the IFS data definitions to other assets.
Commonly these other assets include inflation or exchange rate indexed
bonds and government securities. 11
Table 2
Financial  Prices  and Per Capita  Income
Arithmetic  Means  by  Region




Sub-Saharan  East  North Industrial Latn  South
Africa  Cauibbean  Asia  Africa  Countries America  Asia
Red DepositRae  -3.5  1.6  5.5  0.0  2.0  -4.5  3A
W,eghted  Read  Retun  -8.8  -0.7  2A  -4.3  -0.2  -8.9  -.09
InlaPion  Rawe  17A  7.5  5A  27A  6A  76.7  6.3
Devaluation  Rawe  vs SDR  24.5  29.0  12.6  24.3  -0.4  95.3  7.5
Real  Deiluation  Rate  vs SDR  4.9  17.8  6.9  -2.5  -6.4  8.1  1.3
PerCaita Incom  eUS$  686  2,350  1,961  2,559  12,390  1,519  257
Sub-sample  size  36  12  13  18  17  15  6
24.  Table 2 indicates that mean real interest rates and weighted real return
on financial  assets differ across regions. For real deposit rates, Latin America
and Africa  have a clearly negative means. In the Europe, the Middle East and
11  As the regression  analysis  presented  later in fte paper suggests,  the risk premiuM
required to maintain financial  balances  at high levels of inflation  generates such high real
interest  rates  that some fonn of indexed  or foreign  currency  denominated  inshuments  becomes
necessary  to keep the financial  system from withering.13
North Africa region mean real deposit rates are around 0% p.a.  The rest are
positive and range between the Caribbean  at 1.6%  to East Asia at 5.5%  p.a.  For
the weighted real returns, means in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, the
Middle East and North Africa are clearly negative. As a result, in these
regions, over a year, wealth equal to about 2.5%  of GDP is being transferred
from financial asset holders through the banking system. Typically,  the
government, preferential credit recipients, and bank owners are the
beneficiaries  of these transfers. In the other regions, weighted real returns are
approximately  zero, with the exception  of East Asia, which by virtue of low
inflation has a weighted real return of 2.5%  p.a.  An analysis of variance
supports the heterogeneity of the weighted returns across regions, but not of
the real deposit rate.  Specifically,  the hypotheses that the underlying
population means are equal across all the regions can be rejected at the 1%
level for the weighted real return.  However, this hypothesis cannot be
rejected at even the 10%  level for the real deposit rate.
25.  Although the homogeneity of the real deposit rate across regions might
suggest some sort of law of one price or interest rate parity condition, Table 3
shows that the real deposit rate varies across income groups.  This
heterogeneity is supported by an analysis of variance, i.e., the hypothesis that
the population means are equal for each of the four income groups can be
rejected  at the 5% significance  level. Since real deposit rates rise from
negative 4% p.a. in the low income group to positive 1% in the middle
income group, to 4% in the high income group, but fall to positive 2% p.a. in
the advanced countries, any explanation entailing intemational market forces
equilibrating real deposit rates would have to account for the rise and fall of
real rates as per capita income is increased.
26.  Of course, variation in real rates across income groups does not
preclude the possibility that international market forces are unifying deposit
rates across countries. International capital flows could drive nominal
interest rates, adjusted for the rate of devaluation, towards equality,
However, analyses of variance for the devaluation-adjusted nominal deposit
rate 12 can reject, at the 5% confidence  level, the hypotheses that the
12  As price ratios, the nominal deposit rate divided by the devaluation rate, i.e.,  the rate
of return, in SDRs,  of domestic  deposits.14
population means are equal across either regions or across income groups.
These results suggests that international market forces are not unifying
interest rates globally. However, to pursue this line of investigation further,
an analysis of risk-adjusted,  devaluation-adjusted, nominal deposit rates
would be required.  Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 3
Financial Prces  and Per Capita Income
Arithmetic  Means  by Per Capita Income Level
(rates in percent per annum)
Low  Middle  High  Advd
<USS4S0  USS450-3.000  USS3.00-7.00  >USS7.200
Real Rate an Deposits  -4.3  1.4  3.7  2.0
Weighted  Real Retum  -9.9  -3.7  1.5  -0.2
Inflation  Rate  18.6  28.6  23.5  6.4
Devaluation Rate vs SDR  23.4  41.6  20.7  -0.4
Real Devaluation  Rate vs SDR  2.9  9.0  -2.2  -6A
PerCapitaIncomeusS  266  1,339  5,221  12,390
Sub-sample  size  33  55  12  17
27.  Judging from Table 3, countries in the middle income group appear
most prone to high inflation. One possible explanation is that in middle
income countries the demand for public services,  which tends to rise with
income level (see the Structure of Demand table in the data annex to The
World Bank's World Development  Report), might outstrip  the authorities
abilities to collect revenues in this range of economic development.
However, an analysis of variance cannot reject the hypothesis that mean
inflation is equal across income groups, as it can across regions. Moreover,
Table 5 shows that the correlation  between per capita income and inflation
varies widely across regions, both in sign and magnitude.  Thus, inflation15
seems explained better by political and economic  factors correlated with
geographical  location than by per capita income.
28.  Whereas inflation does not appear to be a per capita income related
phenomenon, real deposit rates and weighted real returns do appear to be per
capita income related, since analyses of variance can reject the hypotheses of
equal means across per capita income classes  at the 5% level. This suggest
that the level of financial development is a determinant of what interest rate
policies  can be sustained, either by govermments  or by financial oligopolies,  or
of what level of interest rates will clear markets.
29.  Figi  .; 2 shows strong, positive correlations  between per capita income
and overall financial depth, and between income and non-monetary depth.
Monetary depth is relatively constant across income groups.  This accords
with the conventional assessment of monetary balances being Lield  for
transactional purposes and generally not as an asset for storing accumulated
wealth. Currency depth is also fairly  constant across income groups, except
for the advanced group where it is down sharply. This reflects a greater
reliance on demand deposits for making transactions in more financially
developed economies.
30.  The strong positive correlation between per capita income and
financial depth suggests that the relative expansion of the formal financial
system is a part of the development  process. Tables  4 and 5, which display
Pearson correlation coefficients  for a selection  of indicators, also generally
reflect the positive correlation between income and financial depth.  Of
course, causality can flow in both directions. Development  entails wealth
accumulation and wealth can be increasingly  held in financial form.
Conversely, increasing the formal financial system's management of resource
flows can result in more efficient intermediation and investment selection,
thus leading to faster growth and greater wealth. Unfortunately, the data are
inadequate to determine the extent to which either of these forces are
operative.16
Figure 2
Financi  Depth Indicators
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31.  Tables  4, 5, and 6 display 'earson  correlation  coefficients  for a selection
of indicators. Table 4 displays them for the entire one hundred seventeen
country sample, Table 5 by regions, and Table 6 by income groups. They
provide information on the relations between monetary and non-monetary
financial instruments, relations between these instruments and key financial
prices, and relations between the financial prices.
32.  Table 4 shows fairly strong correlations  between overall financial and
monetary depth, between overall financial depth and per capita income, and
between non-monetary firn-cial depth and per capita income (see Figure 3).
High correlations exist between inflation and devaluation, and between
inflation and the nominal deposit rate.  All these correlations are positive.17
Table 4
Pearson Correlation  Coefficients
Full  Sample
Pealn  aflm Coefficient
Liquid  Liabilities: GDP vs. MI:  GDP  .6
Liquid  Liabilities:  GDP vs.  Weighted  Real Return  .4
Liquid  Liabilities: GDP  vs. PCY  .5
Quasi  Liquid  Liabilities: GDP vs. M1: GDP  .2
Quasi  Liquid Liabilities:  GDP vs.  Real Deposit  Rate  .3
Quasi  Liquid  Liabilities: GDP vs.  PCY  .6
M1: GDP vs.  Inflation  -.2
M1: GDP vs. Nominal  Deposit  Rate  -.2
M1:GDPvs.PCY  .0
Infladon  vs  Devaluation  .9
Inflation  vs Nominal  Deposit  Rate  .9
33.  The positive correlation between overall financial and monetary depth
is not at all surprising,  since overall  depth  is the sum of monetary  and non-
monetary  depth.  The relatively low correlation between monetary  and non-
monetary  depth  is notable.  This is consistent with  the view that monetary
instruments  are  primarily  maintained  for transactions  purposes  and non-
monetary  financial instruments  are maintained  for wealth  purposes  and
there is substantial  independence  between the two motives.  To the extent
that per capita income proxies wealth, the fairly strong correlation between
non-monetary  depth  and  per capita income, on the one hand,  and  the very
low correlation between monetary  depth  and  per capita income, on the other
hand,  also support  this interpretation.  The small positive correlation
between monetary  and  non-monetary  depth  could reflect either an across-the-
board  shWt  from traditional  to formal financial instruments,  or the waxing
and  waning of public confidence in the formal financial system in general
and,  thus,  its willingness  to hold  formal financial instruments.18
Figure 3
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34.  With monetary depth weakly correlated with both per capita income
and non-monetary depth, it is clear that the positive correlation between
overall financial depth and per capita income is primarily a result of the
correlation between non-monetary depth and per capita income. Looking
back to Figure 1, one can see that, with the exception  of the Europe, Middle
East, and North Africa region, overall financial depth is largely due to non-
monetary depth.  Thus, increasing 'domestic resource mobilization" by
increasing overall financial depth comes largely through the expansion of
interest-bearing instruments.  Because  monetary liabilities are generally
much less costly resources for the formal financial system than interest
bearing liabilites, the balance sheets of the formal financial institutions
increasingly  become a concern  for policy-makers  as greater emphasis is placed
on deepening the domestic financial  system. Accordingly,  interest rate
policies  on lending rates need to be made consistent with any program aimed
at increasing domestic resource mobilization.
35.  Table 4 also shows generally mild correlations  between the depth
indicators and the financial price indicators. Overall financial depth versus19
the weighted real return on the constituent financial instruments is plotted
in Figure 4.  Whereas the positive correlation  is evident in Figure 4, the
countries with highly negative returns are largely responsible. The majority
of the countries duster in a vertical band above zero percent p.a.  Together
with earlier analysis, this suggests that financial prices may not be the
dominant factor in deternlxning  financial depth.  Instead more complicated
processes  are probably at work. The regression analysis presented in the next
section attempts to unravel some of this complexity.
Figure  4
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36.  The high correlations between inflation and devaluation and between
inflation and the nominal interest rate displayed in Table 4 indicate that, in
countries where the government sets interest and exchange rates, policy-
makers set these prices to keep them more or less in line with changes in
goods prices. Where interest and/or  exchange  rates are set in the market, they






Sub-Sahn  Ent  North  Industrial  Latin  South
Africa  Caribbean  Asia  Africa  Countries  America  Asia
Liquid Liab.: GDP vs. M1: GDP  .6  .5  .6  .7  .6  .9  .6
Liquid  Liab.: GDP  vs. Weighted  Redl
Retun  .2  .7  .3  .3  .3  .6  -.1
Liquid Liab.: GDP vs. PCY  .2  .1  .5  .0  .2  .5  .3
Quasi  Liquid  Liab.: GDP vs. M:  GDP  .1  .4  .4  -.2  .4  .7  -.2
Qua  Liqd  LXab.:  GDP vs. Real
Deposit  Rate  .2  .5  .1  .6  .1  .4  .0
Quasi  Liquid  Liab.: GDP vs. PCY  .3  .1  .5  .5  .3  .6  .4
Ml:  GDP vs.  Inflation  -.1  -.7  -.3  -.4  -.2  -.5  -.1
Ml:  GDP vs. Nominal  Depoit Rae  -A  -.2  -.7  -.4  -.3  -.4  -.4
MI:  GDP vs. PCY  -.2  -.3  .1  -A  -.1  .4  .1
ftinon vs. Devahaton  .7  .8  .1  1.0  .6  1.0  -.5
Infl  vs. NomiinalDeposit  Rae  .5  .7  .3  1.0  .9  1.0  -.6
Sub-sample  size  36  12  13  18  17  15  6
37.  Tables  5 and 6, which display the correlations  grouped by region and by
income level, are generally consistent with the correlations for the ful
sample displayed in Table 4.  Nevertheless,  the correlations  across income
group shown in Table 6 more closely  resemble those irn  the full sample than
the correlations across regions shown in Table 5.  Although this, in part, may
be due to the smaUer  sub-samples  on which the regional results are based, the
greater variance in the correlations from the full-sample results may indicate
that macro-financial  behavior is region-specific.21
Table 6
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
by Per Capita  Income Level
Low  Mdl  Hi  Adva=d
<US&450  USS450-3  000  USS3.000-7.200  >USS7.200
Liquid  Liab.: GDP vs. Ml:  GDP  .7  .7  .8  .6
Liquid  Liab.: GDP vs.  Weighted
Real Return  .3  .3  .2  .3
Quasi Liquid  Liab.: GDP vs. Ml:  GDP  .2  .1  .4  .4
Quasi  Liquid Liab.  : GDP vs. Real
DepositRate  .1  .3  .3  .1
Ml:  GDP vs. nflaWion  -.2  -.2  -.3  -.2
MI: GDP vs. Nominal  Deposit  Rate  -.5  -.2  -.3  -.3
Inflation  vs. Devaluation  .7  .9  1.0  .6
Inlation vs Nominal  Deposit  Rat.a  .5  1.0  1.0  .9
Sub-sample  size  33  55  12  17
Regressions
38.  Table  7 displays  coefficient  estimates  for a set of ordinary  least  squares
regressions on the three financial depth variables. The first equation
regresses  overall financial depth (Liquid Liabilities: GDP)  on the weighted
real return, real devaluation, and per capita income. The second and third
equations regress non-monetary  depth (Quasi  Liquid Liabilities  : GDP) and
monetary depth (M1 : GDP) on the nominal deposit rate, inflation, nominal
devaluation, and per capita income. In each of these regressions,  binary
variables for six of the regions are included to capture effects  associated  with
geographical location. 13 All the non-binary  variables are expressed in
13  The seventh region, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, is represented by the
constant variable.  Thus, the coefficient estimates for the other regions represent differens
from the mean of the Europe, the Middle East and North Africa region.22
logarithms, thus the coefficient  estimates can be interpreted as elasticities.
Statistical  significance  at the 10%  level is indicated by *. Statistical  significance




Liquid  Quai Lquid
Liabilities  Liabilitics  Ml
GDP  GDP  GDP
Constant  -1.31*  -4.17*0  -0.60
Weighted  Real  Retur  1.08*  Nominal  Deposit  Rate  0.86  -1.33**
Real  Devaluation  vs. SDR  -0.15  Inflation  -1.83**  0.25
Nominal  Devaluation  vs. SDR  0.43  -0.30
Pi  Capita  ncome (Wealth)  0.12**  0.4100  -0.08
Afica= 1  -0.73*0  0.79**  -0.79*
Caribbean  =1  -0.26  0.10  -0.73**
EastAsia=  1  -0.36**  0.04  -0.83**
Industrial  Countries  = 1  -0.22  -0.35  -0.37*
Latn America=  1  -0.68**  -0.38  -0.57**
South  Asia= i  -0.48**  0.08  -0.77**
Adjusted-R 2 .52  .58  .46
Sample  Size  117  117  117
39.  The three regressions in Table 7 perform respectably  well  Each explains
approximately half of the variation in the dependent variables and gives
coefficient  estimates that are generally as expected. A number of the financial
price variables are statistically  significant  and have the expected signs. As a
proxy for wealth, per capita income appears to be an important determinant
of overall financial and non-monetary depth.  However, per capita income is
not a statistically  significant determinant of monetary depth.  Economic
factors assoiated  with geographical  location are key determinants of
monetary, non-monetary and overall financial depth.23
40.  From a policy perspective, it is important to note that the overall depth
of the financial system is positively influenced by the weighted real return on
the constituent financial instruments.  Since the weighted real return
comprises the weighted nominal return and inflation, each of which is a
different potential policy variable, it is important to determine whether both
components are driving this result.  If not, then it is important to determine
which component is.  The regressions displayed in Taole 8, in which financial
depth is regressed on the weighted nominal return, inflation, and nominal
devaluation, shed some light on this question.
41.  Although the results for the non-monetary and monetary depth
regressions presented in Table 7 are supportive of the results obtained for the
overall aggregate, they are not completely  dear on which policy variable is
driving the weighted real return's influence on the overall aggregate. The
fact that, using essentially the same regressors, the regressions for the two
components of the overall aggregate explain roughly the same amount of
variation as the overall regression and that for the two component equations,
the regressors are generally statistically  significant  with the expccte'd  signs,
supports the specification  for the overall financial depth equation. The large,
statistically significant,  negative coefficient  estimate for inflation in the non-
monetary depth regression and the small, statistically  not significant  elasticity
for inflation in the monetary depth equation both suggest that inflation is at
least one of the policy variables driving the positive influence of the weighted
real return on the overall financial depth.  However, the fairly large,
statistically significant,  negative elasticity for the nominal deposit rate in the
monetary depth equation and the moderate, but statistically not significant,
elasticity in the non-monetary depth equation are ambiguous with respect to
the nominal return's role in influencing the overall financial depth through
the weighted real return.
42.  Judging from the statistically significant,  negative coefficient  estimate
for nominal deposit rates in the monetary depth equation, raising rates
induces the public to economize  on its monetary balances, presumably by
shifting them into non-monetary financial instruments.  However, the
absence of a statistically  significant,  positive elasticity  for nominal deposit
rates in the non-monetary regression casts some doubt on this hypothesized24
behavior. Nevertheless, since the elasticity estimate is of the proper sign and
of reasonable size, the lack of statistically  significance  may ncot  be too damning
of this hypothesis. Instead it may simply reflect the limitations of regression
analysis.  The question of the role of nominal returns in the weighted real
return's influence on overall financial depth simply requires further
exploration.
43.  The absence of identifiable impacts of devaluation on any of the depth
variables may be attributable to limited access to foreign currency
denominated assets in many of the sample countries. 14 Alternatively,  it
could reflect problems proxying devaluation expectations,  given that
devaluation is often discontinuous and abrupt, in contrast to generally
continuous changes in domestic goods prices. In such circumstances,
successful speculation against the central bank requires that moves in and out
of foreign currency ae  *nminated  assets be timed around these abrupt
exchange rate changes. Thus, depending on when the changes occur dunng
the year, annual averages of balances of domestic currency denominated
instruments may be higher or lower, for the same change in end-of-year to
end-of-year exchange rates. 15
44.  The absence of an inflationary impact on monetary assets can be
attributable to either supply effects  (i.e.,  price inflation caused or sustained by
monetary emission)  or, on the demand side, to a lack of suitable real asset
substitutes for monetary instruments in transactions. Without suitable
alternatives, the public will try to sustain its monetary balances roughly in
14  The  inclusion  of foreign  currency  denominated  instruments  in the finarcal aggregates
could also reduce the likelihood  of finding  a devaluation  effect However,  out of the 117
sample  countries,  few have this problem to any appecable degree. Moreover,  previous  work
by the author using tie-series  data that was purged of all known  foreign  currency  denominated
instruments  also gave no indication  of devaluation  effects  games Hanson and Craig Neal, 'Me
Demand  for Liquid Finandal  Assets: Evidence  from 36  Developing  Countrieew  unpublished
discussion  paper, January  1987).
15  The results are not sensitive  to the use of data for devaluation  versus the US$  rather
than the reported devaluation versus the SDR.Table 8
Regression Sensitivity Analysis -1




Ful Sample  Middle  Full Sample  Fuli Sample  Full Sampl  Full Sample
Full Sample  SW  Eas  was  was  s  s
Full  Sa  East  Narh  Indusiial  Latin  South  SubSabara
Samt,l  Caribbean  Asia  Africa  Countries  America  Asia  Africa
Constant  -1.42**  -1.42**  -1.10*  -1.940  -1.53*0  -1.32**  -1.40**  -1.53**
Weighted  Nominal  Retun  0.55  0.48  0.65  0.38  0.49  0.54  0.58  1.25**
Inflation -1.03**  -1.17**  -1.04**  -0.87*  -0.95**  -0.91*  -1.05**  -1.70**
Nominal  Devaluadon  vs. SDR  -0.07  0.12  -0.11  -0.12  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.16
PerCapitaIncome(Wealth)  0.14*  0.14**  0.10  0.17**  0.16*  0.13**  -0.14**  0.16**
Sub-Saharan  Africa  = 1  -0.76**  -0.77**  -0.82**  -0.38  -0.74**  -0.78**  -0.76**
Caribbean  = 1  -0.28*  -0.28*  0.08  -0.27*  -0.27  -0.28*  -0.30*
East  Asia  = 1  -0.40**  -0.41**  -0.03  -0.38**  -0.39**  -0.40**  -0.44
Industrial  Countries  = 1  -0.31*  -0.30*  -0.24  -0.27  -0.31  *  0.34**
Lain America=  1  -0.59**  -0.61**  -0.60**  -0.21  -0.59**  -0.59**  -0.52**
South  Asia  = 1  -0.48*0  -0.49**  -0.57**  -0.08  -0.45*  -0.50**  -0.47**
Adjusted-R 2 .55  .55  .59  .53  .52  .53  .56  .51
SanpleSize  117  105  104  99  100  102  111  81
* indicates  signficae  at the 10%  level
** indicates  significant  at the 5% level26
line with its transaction needs.  That nominal deposit rates negatively impact
on monetary balances can be attributed to a degree of substitutability of non-
monetary financial instruments in transaction balances (i.e., non-monetary
assets can be used to economize  on transaction balances).
45.  Table 8, in addition to investigating  the separate influences of nominal
returns and inflation on overall financial depth, provides some insight into
the stability of the regression coefficients  with respect to changes in the
sample data. This sensitivity analysis proceeds by running regressions on
data sets comprising the ful  sample with each region's data deleted one at a
time.
46.  In terms of the coefficient  estimates and their significance  levels, the
results in Table 8 are consistent across regions-with  the exception  of the
regression for the full-sample sans the Sub-Saharan  African data-and  with
the full-sample regression. It turns out that this is an important exception.
WVhereas  all the other regressions show statistically  not significant weighted
nominal return coefficient  estimates of about .5, and show statistically
significant inflation elasticities of about -1.0,  the sans Sub-Saharan regression
gives statistically significant estimates for the weighted nominal return
elasticity  of 1.25  and inflation  elasticity  of -1.70. It appears as though the Sub-
Saharan data is suppressing the influence of these two financial prices.
47.  Table 9 presents results for regressions  run on the Sub-Saharan  data
only.  Judging from these results, there are either some serious deficiencies  in
the Sub-Saharan  data, or some significant differences  in macro-financial
behavior in Sub-Saharan  Africa when compared with the rest of the regions
in the sample. The Sub-Saharan  regressions explain a markedly smaler
percent of the variation in the depth variables and give exceptionally  high
numeric estimates for some of the elasticities,  in particular the estimate of
12.7  for the weighted nominal return in the overal financial depth
equation.16  These results and the absence  of significant,  negative inflation
elasticities for the overal  and non-monetary depth equations, in contrast to
all the previous results, suggest something is amiss with the Sub-Saharan
16  The weighted real return/real devaluation specification  of the overall flnandal depth
regression  explained  only 4% of the variation in the dependent variable. The F-ratio for the
entire equation was only 15.27
equation and/or  data.  Moreover, having run these regressions on numerous
sub-sets of the Sub-Saharan  data, it is clear that the odd results for this region
cannot be attributed to only a small number of countries.
Table 9
Regression  Results
Sub-Saharan  Africa Only
Uqcid  Quasi  Liquid
Liabilities  Liabilities  Ml
GDP  GDP  GDP
Constant  -1.580*  -4.79**  -1.27**
Weighted  Nominal  Return  12.71*  Nominal  Deposit  Rate  -5.78  -2.97**
nflation  0.17  -1.88  0.46
Nominal  Devaluation  Vs.  SDR  -0.79  1.53  -0.30
Per  Capita  Income  (Wealth)  -0.04  0.45**  -0.07
Adjusted-R 2 .33  .18  .15
Sanple  Size  36  36  36
48.  One possible explanation for the regionally unique macro-financial
behavior follows from the relatively early stage of economic and financial
development in most Sub-Saharan  countries. In early stages of development,
formal market mechanisms are weak, particularly those in financial markets.
This leaves traditional mechanisms and histitutions as the primary vehicles
for carrying out economic  activities. To examine the possibility that
institutions are dominant factors in Sub-Saharan  macro-financial  activity, the
regressions in Table 9 were run with binary variables for the primary
European language spoken in the country. These binary language variables
proxy the institutional framework bequeathed by the former colonial powers.
As it turns out, the language binaries make no significant contribution to
explaining financial aggregates. With no adequate behavioral explanation for
the exceptionally  poor Sub-Saharan  regressions,  the most likely candidate to28
explain the odd S'ub-Saharan results is poor quality  data.17 Accordingly, the




Full Sample sans Sub-Saharan  Africa
UiqWd  Quasi  Liqudd
Liabilities  Liabilides  MI
GDP  GDP  GDP
Constant  -1.29**  -3.62*  *  -0.61
WeightedRealRemrn  1.79**  NominalDepositRate 2.180  -1.19**
Real  Devaluation  vs. SDR  -0.31  Inflation -2.5800  -0.04
Nominal  Devaluation  vs. SDR  0.15  -0.15
Per Capita  Income  (Wealth)  0.12*  0.370*  -0.07
Caribbean  = 1  -0.23  0.15  -0.75**
East Asia  =1  -0.40**  -0.03  -0.86*
Industrial  Countries  = 1  -0.26  -0.28  -0.37*
Latin  America  = 1  -0.63**  -0.29  -0.58**
South  Asia = 1  -0.26**  -0.10  -0.78*
Adjusted-R 2 .44  .50  .48
Sample  Size  81  81  81
49.  Table 10 displays  the three basic regressions for the three financial
depth  variables  run on  the full-sample sans the Sub-Saharan data.  The
17  To  assess  whether  the consumer  price  data  are the suspect  data, tae Sub-Saharan
regressions  were mn  using  inflation  in the GDP  deflator  in place of inflation  in consumer  price
data. The results  were  essentially  the same.
18  With  an F statistic  of 435,  the standard  test  for  "structural  change"  can reject  the
hypothesis  that the Sub-Saharan  data are part of the overall  sample  at the 1%  level. With  F
statistics  no larger  than  1.86  for any  of  the other  regions,  the standard  test cannot  reject
equivalent  hypotheses  for the other  regions  at even  the  5%  leveL29
results are similar to those for the full sample displayed in Table 7, except that
elasticity  of the overall financial depth with respect to real weighted return is
greater, as are the elasticities  of the non-monetary depth with respect to the
nominal deposit rate and with respect to inflation. Whereas the nominal
deposit rate elasticity  estimate is not statistically significant in the non-
monetary depth equation over the full sample, it is statistically  significant
over the this sample. Also, the elasticity  of monetary depth with respect to
the nominal deposit rate is lower in the sans Sub-Saharan sample.
Accordingly,  it can be expected that the estimates of elasticities  of overall
financial depth with respect to both the weighted nominal return and
inflation will be statistically significant in the weighted nominal
return/nominal  devaluation specification. Table 11 displays the results of
this equation and a sensitivity analysis similar to that undertaken in Table 8.
50.  However, before proceeding to Table 11,  note that the regional binaries
are not statistically significant in the non-monetary depth regression. With
the Sub-Saharan  data out of the sample, the determinants of non-monetary
depth appear to be the same across all regions. 19 In fact, with the Sub-
Saharan data out of the sample the cross-regional  differences in overall
financial depth and monetary depth boil down to the difference  in monetary
depth between the Europe, Middle East, and North Africa  region and the rest
of the sample countries taken together. 20
19  With an F statistic  of 1.55,  the standard test of the hypothesis that the coefficients  on
the regional  binaries are not all zero  cannot be rejected  at even the 10%  level.
20  F-tests  cannot reject  the hypotheses  that the proper specifications  of the overall
financial  depth and monetary depth regressions  entail only one regional  binary variable  for
the Europe,  Middle  East,  and North Africa  region. The F statistics  are 135 and 89 for the
overall finandal depth and monetary depth equations, respectively.Table 11
Regression Sensitivity Analysis -2




Full  Sample  Africa  Full Sample  Full  Sample  Full  Sample Full  Sample  sAM  &  sW  am  as Full  s  Sub-SIaa  Euwpe,  Sub-Shaa  Sub-Saharan  Sub-Saharan Sampl  Subhan  Afiica  Middle  Afica  Afiica  Afiica
SWu  Aica  &  East,  &  &  & Sub-Shmaan  &  East  Nolt  uial  Latin  South Africa  Caribbean  Asia  Africa  Countries  America  Asia
Constant  -1.53**  -1.72**  -0.98*  -2.40**  -1.72**  -1.24**  -1.51**
WeightedNotminalRetun  1.25**  1.05*  1.42**  1.19*  1.07*  1.67**  1.33**
Inflation  -1.70*e  1.87**  -1.67**  -1.57*  -1.54**  -2.41**  -1.79**
Nominal Devaluation  vs. SDR  -0.16  0.17  -0.30  -0.26  -0.13  -0.09  -0.15
PerCapitaIncome (Wealth)  0.16**  0.19**  0.09  0.22**  0.19**  0.14*  0.16**
Caribbean = 1  -0.30*  -0.29**  0.21  -0.29*  -0.36**  -0.30*
East  Asia= 1  -0.44**  -0.45**  0.08  -0.41*  -0.52**  -0.45**
Industria Countres = 1  -0.39**  -0.42**  -0.27  -0.39**  -0.39**
Latin  America  = 1  -0.52**  -0.54**  -0.54**  -0.01  -0.52**  -0.52*
South  Asia  = 1  -0.47**  -0.430  -0.62**  0.18  -0.42*  -0.59**
Adjusted-R 2 .51  .51  .58  .55  .51  .33  .49
SampleSize  81  69  68  63  64  66  75
*  indcats  sipffIcance  at the 10%  levd
* IndIcates  sIgnificant  at the 5% level31
51.  In Table 11, the regressions of overall  financial depth  on the sample
with  the Sub-Saharan data purged  have statistically significant elasticity
estimates  for the weighted  nominal return  and inflation, as expected.21
Accordingly, both policy variables appear operative.  If one accepts these
results, the next question becomes what are the relative impacts of the two
variables.  In other words,  does raising nominal deposit  rates promote
financial  depth  more  effectively than  lowering inflation?  Alternatively,
what happens  to real deposit rates as nominal rates are increased  to offset the
corrosive effect of inflation  on overall  financial depth?
52.  Judging from the coefficient estimates  for the weighted  nominal  return
and  inflation  in the regressions displayed  in Table 11, overaU financial depth
respond  more elastically  to inflation  than  to the weighted  nominal  return.
Moreover, given that nominal  deposit  rates-the  most practical policy
variable  for influencing  the weighted  nominal  return-has  a weight  less than
one, i.e., equal to the  share of non-monetary  instruments  in overall  financial
instrument,  raising  nominal deposit  rates is even less effective at increasing
overall  financial  depth  than  inflation.22
53.  For example, using the coefficient estimates for the regression on the
full-sample sans Sub-Saharan data and given a country with:  i  per capita
income of US$2,000, ii) zero devaluation,  iii) zero inflation, iv) nominal
deposit rates of 3% p.a., and v) a 50-50 split between monetary  and non-
monetary  financial instruments,  the predicted  overall  financial depth  is equal
to 74% of GDP.  If inflation (and devaluation)  rise to 10%, then overall
financial depth  drops to 63%. If nominal deposit rates are raised to 13.3%  to
21  Admittedly, by virtue of the data set selection  process,  the t-tests  have lost some
power. However,  given that  V  no pre-selection  of data has occurred  prior to this point, ii) the
F-test  for structural change singled  out the Sub-Saharan  data as the only region  identifiably
not part of the overall sample,  iii) the coefficient  estimates  are stable in the sensitivity
analysis  presented in Table 11,  and iv) the results are generally  consistent  with all of the
empirical  findings presented in this paper, the author finds the results quite credible.
Moreover,  to the extent that one is interested  in forecasting  at this point, rather than
hypothesis  testing questions  regarding the power of the t-tests  are less relevant.
22  The  following  calculations  assume  no shifts  in the mix  of monetary  versus  non-monetary
instuments.  Given that higher  nominal  deposit rates  induce a shift towards non-monetary
instruments  and, thus, raise the nominal  deposit  rate's weight  in the weighted  nominal  return,
the calculations  understate the nominal deposit rate's salutary effects  on financial  depth.
Nevertheless,  since  there are limits to the public's  ability to economize  on transactions
balances,  these calculations  are probably  not ovtrly biased.32
maintain a real deposit rate of 3%, then financial depth rises back to 67%. In
order to maintain financial depth at 74%  of GDP,  nominal rates have to be
raised to 32%,  which translates into a real rate of 21%.
54.  At even higher inflation rates, financial depth is suppressed further
and the real deposit rates required to offset the corrosive  effect of inflation rise
dramatically. Maintaining  a 3% real deposit rate in the face of inflation at
50% p.a. leaves financial depth at 48%  of GDP. Maintaining  a 3% real deposit
rate at 100%  inflation reduces financial depth further to 37%  of GDP. The real
deposit rates required to fully offset 100%  inflation are in excess  of 200%  p.a.
These numbers make it quite clear that raising nominal deposit rates is not an
effective way of increasing financial depth.  Instead, lower inflation is the
only sustainable way to increase financial depth and capture the potential
efficiency  gains that increasing the scope and scale of the formal financial
system can offer to an economy.
55.  That inflation has a greater negative effect on overall financial depth
than nominal deposit rates have a positive effect probably reflects the fact that
higher inflation is generally correlated with more volatile inflation.  Since
suden bursts of inflation can quickly erode the real value of financial asset
balances and can produce dangerous mismatchs in the terms and maturities
of the assets and liabilities of financial institutions, higher inflation is
strongly correlated with the riskiness of holding financial assets. Accordingly,
high inflation may cause risk-averse wealth holders to further shift out of
non-monetary financial assets than they would based on the simple price
effect.
Condlusions
56.  Based on the analysis of macro-fmancial  data from one hundred
seventeen developing and industrial countries for the year 1985,  it is apparent
that
Overall financial depth, non-monetary financial depth, and the
weighted real return on financial assets systematically  vary
across geographical  regions and across per capita income groups.33
*  Deep financal systems usually reflect non-monetary depth, with
the exception of countries in the Europe, Middle East, and North
Africa region, which generally reflect monetary depth.
*  Monetary depth is broadly consistent across income groups and
geographical  region, with the exception  of the Europe, Middle
East and North Africa region, which is unusually deep
(reflecting  very high Ml:  GDP ratios in six of the eighteen
sample countries).
*  Per capita income (a proxy for wealth or development) and
factors associated with geographic location are key determinants
of overall financial depth.
*  Inflation has a clearly negative influence on overall financial
depth.
*  Nominal deposit rates have a positive influence on overall
financial depth.
*  However, inflation is more corrosive on financial depth than
nominal deposit rates are salutary. As a result, reducing
inflation is the only sustainable way of increasing the size of the
financial system. Raising nominal deposit rates to fully offset
higher inflation requires maintaining exceptionally high real
deposit rates.
*  Although this study could not determine which factor is
responsible, either anomalous macro-financial  behavior or poor
data quality (or both) seems to produce odd results when data
from the Sub-Saharan  region are used in the regression analysis.Annex
Country  Rankings37
COUNTRIES  BY REGION
Region  Countxy  Per Capita Income
Sub-Saharan  Africa (AF)
BENIN  270
BOTSWANA  840
BURKINA FASO  150
BURUNDI  240
CAMEROON  910
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  290
CHAD  140
CONGO, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  1,040
COTE D'IVOIRE, REPUBLIC  OF  740
ETHIOPIA  120
GABON  3,020














SIERRA LEONE  310
SOMALIA  280














DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  710
GRENADA  1,24038
COUNTRIES  BY  REGION
Regn  2MCount  Per Capita Income
HAITI  330
JAMAICA  880
ST.  CHRISTOPHER  AND NEVIS  1,700
ST.  LUCIA  1,320
ST.  VINCENT  & THE GRENADINES  960





KOREA,  REPUBLIC  OF  2,370
MALAYSIA  1,850
NEW ZEALAND  7,110
PAPUA  NEW GUINEA  690
PHILIPPINES  570
SINGAPORE  7,410
SOLOMON  ISLANDS  530
THAILAND  810
VANUATU  867
WESTERN  SAMOA  680
Europe,  Middle East  & North Africa  (EMENA)
ALGERIA  2,570
CYPRUS  4,360











SYRIAN  ARAB  REPUBLIC  1,560
TUNISIA  1,140
TURKEY  1,110
YEMEN,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  550
YUGOSLAVIA  2,300
Industral Countries  (ND)
AUSTRALIA  11,91039
COUNTRIES  BY  REGION















UNITED  KINGDOM  8,920i






COSTA  RICA  1,420
ECUADOR  1,160















SRI LANKA  40040
COUNTRIES BY OVERALL FINANCIAL DEPTH
Counhy  Region  Liquid Liabilities:  GDP
ZAIRE  AF  .09
UGANDA  AF  .10
SOMALIA  AF  .10
GHANA  AF  .10
RWANDA  AF  .13
ARGENTINA  LA  .13
CONGO, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  AF  .14
NIGER  AF  .16
PERU  LA  .17
ECUADOR  LA  .17
BURUNDI  AF  .17
CAMEROON  AF  .18
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  AF  .18
GABON  AF  .18
PARAGUAY  LA  .18
BRAZIL  LA  .19
SIERRA LEONE  AF  .19
PHILIPPINES  EA  .21
BURKINA FASO  AF  .21
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  CR  .21
WESTERN SAMOA  EA  .21
INDONESIA  EA  .22
BANGLADESH  SA  .23
MALAWI  AF  .23
MAURITANIA  AF  .23
GAMBIA, THE  AF  .23
MEXICO  LA  .23
TURKEY  EMENA  .24
BENIN  AF  .24
MADAGASCAR  AF  .24
CHAD  AF  .25
GUATEMALA  LA  .25
SENEGAL  AF  .25
MALI  AF  25
BOTSWANA  AF  .26
SUDAN  AF  .26
NEPAL  SA  .27
COTE D'IVOIRE, REPUBLIC  OF  AF  .28
HAITI  CR  .28
ICELAND  IND  .28
ZAMBIA  AF  .29
SWAZILAND  AF  .29
SRI LANKA  SA  .29
HONDURAS  LA  .29
TANZANIA  AF  .3041
COUNTRIES  BY  OVERALL  FINANCIAL  DEPTH
Counr  Region  Liquid  Liabilities: GDP
COLOMBIA  LA  .30
NIGERIA  AF  .32
SOLOMON  ISLANDS  EA  .32
SEYCHELLES  AF  .32
PAPUA  NEW GUINEA  EA  .34
EL SALVADOR  LA  .35
BURMA  SA  .35
PAKISTAN  SA  .36
URUGUAY  LA  .37
COSTA  RICA  LA  .37
FIJI  EA  .37
ETHIOPIA  AF  .38
POLAND  EMENA  .39
KENYA  AF  .39
KOREA,  REPUBUC OF  EA  39
MATJRTIUS  AF  .41
BELIZE  LA'  .43
YUGOSLAVIA  EMENA  .43
HUNGARY  EMENA  .43
ZIMBABWE  AF  .43
TOGO  AF  .44
INDIA  SA  .45
FINLAND  IND  .46
SWEDEN  IND  .46
CHINA  EA  .46
TUNISIA  EMENA  .47
JAMAICA  CR  .47
BARBADOS  CR  .48
DOMINICA  CR  .48
IRELAND  EMENA  .49
LESOTHO  AF  .51
BAHAMAS  CR  .51
MOROCCO  EMENA  .52
GRENADA  CR  .52
DENMARK  IND  .53
SOUTH  AFRICA  AF  .55
NEW ZEALAND  EA  .55
BELGIUM  IND  .56
NORWAY  IND  .56
TRINIDAD  AND TOBAGO  CR  .56
THAILAND  EA  .59
UNITED KINGDOM  IND  .60
GERMANY,  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  IND  .61
AUSTRALIA  IND  .62
CANADA  IND  .6242
COUNTRIES  BY  OVERALL  FINANCIAL  DEPTH
Counfry  Regt=  Liqid  Llab  lldes:  GDP
SPAIN  EMENA  .62
ST. VINCENT  & THE GRENADINES  CR  .62
ANTIGUA  AND BARBUDA  CR  .63
VENEZUELA  LA  .65
ST. LUCIA  CR  .66
CYPRUS  EMENA  .66
UNITED  STATES  IND  .66
ISRAEL  EMENA  .68
FRANCE  IND  .70
EGYPT,  ARAB  REPUBLC  OF  EMENA  .71
SYRIAN  ARAB  REPUBWC  EMENA  .71
GREECE  EMENA  .73
SURINAME  LA  .78
AUSTRIA  IND  .78
ALGERIA  EMENA  .80
ITALY  IND  .80
NETHERLANDS  INb  .d7
VANUATU  EA  .92
YEMEN,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  .95
ST. CHRISTOPHER  AND NEVIS  CR  1.01
SINGAPORE  EA  1.02
MALAYSIA  EA  1.05
PORTUGAL  EMENA  1.08
JORDAN  EMENA  1.16
MALTA  EMENA  135
SWITZERLAND  IND  1.40
JAPAN  IND  15643
COUNTRIES  BY NON-MONETARY DEPTH
CMU*Y  Region  Quasi Liquid Liabilities: GDP
ZAIRE  AF  .01
CHAD  AF  .01
CENTRAL  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC  AF  .01
UGANDA  AF  .01
GHANA  AF  .02
SOMAUA  AF  .02
MALI  AF  .03
CONGO,  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  AP  .03
MAURITANIA  AF  .04
NIGER  AF  .04
RWANDA  AF  .04
BURUNDI  AF  .04
ECUADOR  LA  .05
BENIN  AF  .05
SEIRRA  LEONE  AF  .06
BURKINA  FASO  AF  .06
SUDAN  AF  .07
GABON  AF  .08
CAMEROON  AF  .09
SENEGAL  AF  .09
ARGENTlNA  LA  .09
MADAGASCAR  AF  .10
COTE DYIVOIRE,  REPUBLIC  OF  AF  .10
TANZANIA  AF  .10
SYRIAN  ARAB  REPUBLIC  EMENA  .10
PEtRU  LA  .10
PARAGUAY  LA  .10
GAMBIA,  THE  AF  .10
BURMA  SA  .11
INDONESIA  EA  .12
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  CR  .13
BANGLADESH  SA  .13
PAKISTAN  SA  .13
WESTERN  SAMOA  EA  .13
HAITI  CR  .13
ETHIOPIA  AF  .14
NIGERIA  AF  .14
ALGERIA  EMENA  .14
MALAWI  AF  .14
NEPAL  SA  .14
TURKEY  EMENA  .14
ZAMBIA  AF  .15
BRAZIL  LA  .15
PHILIPPINES  EA  .15
GUATEMALA  LA  .1644
COUNTRIES  BY  NON-MONETARY  DEPTH
Counhy  Reiton  Quasi lquld Liabilities: GDP
CHINA  EA  .16
BOTSWANA  AP  .16
POLAND  EMENA  .17
HONDURAS  LA  .18
TOGO  AF  .18
MEXICO  LA  .18
ICELAND  IND  .18
MOROCCO  EMENA  .18
SRI LANKA  SA  .19
SOLOMON  ISLANDS  EA  .19
COLOMBIA  LA  .19
YEMEN,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  20
EL  SALVADOR  LA  .20
SEYCHELLES  AF  .20
SWAZILAND  AF  .20
TUNISIA  EM  ENA  .20
COSTA  RICA  LA  .22
HUNGARY  EMENA  .22
PAPUA  NEW GUINEA  EA  24
KENYA  AF  26
DENMARK  IND  26
FIji  EA  26
BELIZE  LA  .28
MAURrlTUS  AF  28
INDIA  SA  29
LESOTHO  AP  30
KOREA,  REPUBLIC  OF  EA  .30
URUGUAY  LA  .31
YUGOSLAVIA  EMENA  .31
ZIMBABWE  AF  32
BARBADOS  CR  .35
SOUTH  AFRICA  AF  .35
BELGIUM  IND  35
SWEDEN  IND  .36
GRENADA  CR  .36
JAMAICA  CR  .36
IRELAND  EMENA  36
DOMINICA  CR  37
SURINAME  LA  37
EGYPT,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  38
NORWAY  IND  38
FINLAND  IND  38
ITALY  IND  .40
BAHAMAS  CR  .40
SPAIN  EMENA  Al45
COUNTRIES BY NON-MONETARY DEPTH
Coumtzy  Raion  Quasi Uquid Liabilides: GDP
VENEZUELA  LA  .42
UNrIED EKNGDOM  IND  44
TRINIDAD  AND TOBAGO  CR  .44
ST. VINCENT  & THE GRENADINES  CR  .45
GERMANY,  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  IND  .45
FRANCE  IND  .46
NEW ZEALAND  EA  .47
CYPRUS  EMENA  .49
CANADA  IND  .49
AN&IGUA  AND BARBUDA  CR  .50
THAILAND  EA  .50
AUSTRALIA  IND  .51
UNTED STATES  IND  .51
sT.  LUCIA  CR  .52
GREECE  EMENA  .59
JORDAN  IEMENA  .61
AUSTRIA  IND  .65
ISRAEL  EMENA  .65
NETHERLANDS  IND  .66
MALTA  EMENA  .67
VANUATU  EA  .70
SINGAPORE  EA  .80
PORTU(GAL  EMENA  .83
ST. CHRISTOPHER  AND NEVIS  CR  .85
MALAYSIA  EA  .88
SWITZERLAND  IND  1.09
JAPAN  IND  1.2846
COUNTRIES BY MONETARY  DEPTH
Countzy  -.  Region  Ml:GDP
ISRAEL  EMENA  .02
BRAZIL  LA  .04
ARGENTINA  LA  .04
PHILIPPINES  EA  .05
URUGUAY  LA  .06
ME)CCO  LA  .06
PERU  LA  .06
FINLAND  IND  .08
SOMALIA  AF  .08
PARAGUAY  LA  .08
NEW ZEALAND  EA  .08
WESTERN  SAMOA  EA  .08
MALAWI  AF  .08
RWANDA  AF  .08
UGANDA  AF  .08
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  CR  .08
ZAIRE  AF  .08
SWAZILAND  AF  .08
GHANA  AP  .08
THAILAND  EA  .09
CAMEROON  AF  .09
KOREA,  REPUBLIC  OF  EA  .09
GUATEMALA  LA  .09
TURKEY  EMENA  .09
BANGLADESH  SA  .09
BOTSWANA  AF  .10
INDONESIA  EA  .10
ICELAND  IND  .10
COLOMBIA  LA  .10
PAPUA  NEW GUINEA  EA  .10
GABON  AF  .11
SRI LANKA  SA  .11
SWEDEN  IND  .11
FIJI  EA  .11
AUSTRALIA  IND  .11
ZIMBABWE  AF  .11
CONGO,  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  AF  .11
YUGOSLAVIA  EMENA  .11
BAHAMAS  CR  .11
TRINDAD AND TOBAGO  CR  .11
JAMAICA  CR  .12
ECUADOR  LA  .12
DOMINICA  CR  .12
HONDURAS  LA  .12
NIGER  AF  .1247
COUNTRIES BY MONIETARY  DEPTH
Coundzy  Realm  Ml: GDP
NEPAL  SA  .12
MAURrlIIJS  AF  .12
SEYCHELLES  AF  .13
BURUNDI  AF  .13
CANADA  IND  .13
ANTIGUA  AND BARBUDA  CR  .13
IRELAND  EMENA  .13
AUSTRIA  IND  .13
GAMBIA,  'HE  AF  .13
SIERRA  LEONE  AF  .13
KENYA  AF  .13
SOLOMON  ISLANDS  EA  .13
BARBADOS  CR  .13
GREECE  EMENA  .14
ZAMBIA  AF  .14
HAITI  CR  .14
ST. LUCIA  CR  .14
BELIZE  LA  .15
MADAGASCAR  AF  .15
EL  SALVADOR  LA  .15
BURKINA  FASO  AF  .15
UN1TED  STATES  IND  .15
COSTA  RICA  LA  .15
ST.  CHRISTOPHER  AND NEVIS  CR  .15
GERMANY,  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  IND  .16
SENEGAL  AF  .16
UNITED  KINGDOM  IND  .16
INDIA  SA  .16
CENTRAL  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC  AF  .17
ST. VINCENT  & THE GRENADINES  CR  .17
GRENADA  CR  .17
CYPRUS  EMENA  .17
MALAYSIA  EA  .18
COTE DIIVOIRE,  REPUBLIC  OF  AF  .18
NORWAY  IND  .18
NIGERIA  AF  .18
BENIN  AF  .19
SUDAN  AF  .19
SOUTH  AFRICA  AF  .19
MAURITANIA  A?  .20
TANZANIA  AF  .20
BELGIUM  IND  .20
HUNGARY  EMENA  .21
LESOTHO  AF  .21
NETHERLANDS  IND  .2148
COUNTRIES  BY MONETARY  DEPTH
Corl  Rezan  Ml:GDP
SPAIN  EMENA  .21
POLAND  EMENA  .21
VANUATU  EA  .22
PAKISTAN  SA  22
SINGAPORE  EA  .22
MALI  AF  23
VENEZUELA  LA  23
CHAD  AF  24
BURMA  SA  24
FRANCE  IND  24
ETHIOPIA  AF  25
PORTUGAL  EMENA  25
TOGO  AF  26
TUNISIA  EMENA  27
DENMARK  IND  27
JAPAN  IND  27
CHINA  EA  .30
SWIMERLAND  IND  32
MOROCCO  EMENA  .33
EGYPT,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  33
ITALY  IND  .41
SURINAME  LA  .41
JORDAN  EMENA  .56
SYRIAN  ARAB  REPUBLIC  EMENA  .61
ALGERIA  EMENA  .66
MALTA  EMENA  .67
YEMEN,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  .7549
COUNTRIES BY CURRENCY  DEPTH
Couny  RWon  Cuvnc_: GDP
BRAZIL  LA  .01
ISRAEL  EMENA  .01
ICELAND  IND  .01
NEW ZEALAND  EA  .02
FINLAND  IND  .02
SWAZILAND  AF  .02
PERU  LA  .02
ARGENTINA  LA  .03
BOTSWANA  AF  .03
SOMALIA  AF  .03
DENMARK  IND  .03
SOUTH  AFRICA  AF  .03
MEXaCO  LA  .03
WESTERN  SAMOA  EA  .03
CANADA  IND  .03
URUGUAY  LA  .03
BAHAMAS  CR  .03
YUGOSLAVIA  EMENA  .03
GABON  AF  .03
ECUADOR  LA  .03
CAMEROON  AF  .03
MALAWI  AF  .03
TURKEY  EMENA  .03
PHILIPPINES  EA  .03
ZIMBABWE  AF  .03
COLOMBIA  LA  .04
UNiTED  KINGDOM  IND  .04
TRIDAD  AND TOBAGO  CR  .04
UGANDA  AF  .04
PAPUA  NEW  GUINEA  EA  .04
AUSTRALIA  IND  .04
VENEZUELA  -LA  .04
DOMINICA  CR  - .04
KOREA,  REPUBUC  OF  EA  .04
JAMAICA  CR  .04
PARAGUAY  LA  .04
BANGLADESH  SA  .04
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  CR  .04
UNITED  STATES  IND  .04
ZAMBIA  AF  .04
FIJI  EA  .04
RWANDA  AF  .04
INDONESIA  EA  .04
FRANCE  IND  .04
ZAIRE  AF  .0450
COUNTRIES BY CURRENCY  DEPTH
Ca!m  Regmn  Cunetcy; GDP
COSTA  RICA  LA  .04
NIGER  AP  .05
LESOTHO  AF  .05
KENYA  AF  .05
NORWAY  IND  .05
CONGO,  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  AF  .05
GUATEMALA  LA  .05
SWEDEN  IND  .05
BARBADOS  CR  .05
ANTIGUA  AND BARBUDA  CR  .05
GHANA  AF  .05
BENIN  AF  .05
IJRELAND  EMENA  .05
GERMEANY,  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  IND  .As
HONDURAS  LA  .06
ST. CHRISMOPHER  AND NEVIS  CR  .06
SRI LANKA  SA  .06
MAURMTIUS  AF  .06
MADAGASCAR  AF  .06
BURUNDI  AF  .06
THAILAND  EA  .06
BELIZE  LA  .06
EL SALVADOR  LA  .06
AUSTRIA  IND  .06
ITALY  IND  .06
SENEGAL  AF  .06
ST. LUCIA  CR  .06
SEYCHELLES  AF  .06
GAMBIA,  THE  AF  .06
SOLOMON  ISLANDS  EA  .07
JAPAN  IND  .07
BURKINA  FASO  AF  .07
HAITI  CR  .07
NIGERIA  AF  .07
NETHERLANDS  IND  .07
SPAIN  EMENA  .07
VANUATU  EA  .07
SERRA LEONE  AF  .07
GRENADA  CR  .08
MAURITANIA  AF  .08
CYPRUS  EMENA  .08
PORTUGAL  EMlENA  .08
BELGIUM  IND  .08
MALAYSIA  EA  .08
NEPAL  SA  .0851
COUNTRIES BY CURRENCY  DEPTH
Crunts  Ragko  Cummy:GDP
CaTE DlVOIRE,  REPUBLIC  OF  AF  .08
SUDAN  AF  .08
TUNISIA  EMENA  .09
HU'NGARY  EMENA  .09
POLAND  EMENA  .09
ST.  VINCENT  & THE GRENADINES  CR  .09
GREECE  EMENA  .09
TANZANIA  AF  .10
INDIA  SA  .10
CHINA  EA  .10
MALI  AF  .11
PAKISTAN  SA  .11
TOGO  AF  .11
SWITZERLAND  IND  .12
SINGAPORE  EA  .12
CENTRAL  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC  AF  .13
MOROCCO  EMENA  .13
ETHIOPIA  AF  .13
CHAD  AF  .16
EGYPT,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  .19
SURNAME  LA  .20
BURMA  SA  .22
ALGERIA  EMENA  .25
SYRLAN  ARAB  REPUBLIC  EMENA  .34
JORDAN  EMENA  .35
MALTA  EMENA  .58
YEMEN,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  .6252
COUNTRIES BY INFLATION
Country  Reon  flation  (% pA)
BURUNDI  AF  -6.0
RWANDA  AF  -2.7
CHAD  AF  -0.4
NIGERIA  AF  -0.3
BELIZE  LA  -0.3
BURKINA  FASO  AF  0.0
SURINAME  LA  0.0
SRI LANKA  SA  0.0
NIGER  AF  0.3
MALTA  EMENA  0.4
MALAYSIA  EA  0.6
SINGAPORE  EA  0.6
ST. VINCENT  & THE GRENADINES  CR  0.9
VANUATU  EA  0.9
CAMEROON  AF  1.2
CONGO,  PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  AF  1.2
SEYCHELLES  AF  1.A
ST. LUCIA  CR  1.4
GRENADA  CR  15
JAPAN  IND  1.6
ANTIGUA  AND BARBUDA  CR  1.6
NETHERLANDS  IND  1.8
GERMANY,  FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  IND  1.8
JORDAN  EMENA  1.8
AUSTRIA  IND  2.7
BARBADOS  CR  2.7
KOREA,  REPUBLIC  OF  EA  3.0
SWITZERLAND  IND  3.1
TOGO  AF  3A
ST. CHRISTOPHER  AND NEVIS  CR  3.5
THAILAND  EA  3.5
UNITED  STATES  IND  35
DENMARK  IND  3.6
CYPRUS  EMENA  3.6
DOMICA  CR  3.8
HONDURAS  LA  4.0
BENIN  AF  4.0
BELGIUM  IND  4.1
CANADA  IND  4.2
PAPUA  NEW GUINEA  EA  4.3
COTE DIIVOIRE,  REPUBLIC  OF  AF  4A
BAHAMAS  CR  4.6
INDONESIA  EA  4.8
FRANCE  IND  4.8
BURMA  SA  4.953
COUNTRIES BY INFLATION
Coon"  Regin  Inflation (% pa.)
IRELAND  EMENA  4.9
FINLAND  IND  4.9
MAURlllUS  AF  5.1
UNITED  KINGDOM  IND  55
NORWAY  IND  5.7
SWEDEN  IND  6A
PAKISTAN  SA  6.7
MAU  AF  6.7
WESTERN  SAMOA  EA  6.8
VENEZUELA  LA  6.9
TRINIDAD  AND TOBAGO  CR  7.1
TUNISIA  EMENA  7.2
ZIMBABWE  AF  73
GABON  AF  7.7
PHILIPPINES  EA  7.7
HUNGARY  EMIENA  7.7
BOTSWANA  AF  7.9
INDIA  SA  8.0
NEPAL  SA  8.0
SOLOMON  ISLANDS  EA  8.1
FIJI  EA  8.2
SPAIN  EMENA  8.2
AUSTRALIA  IND  8.2
MOROCCO  EMENA  8.8
ITALY  IND  8.9
CHINA  EA  9.0
BANGLADESH  SA  10.2
MALAWI  AF  10.5
MADAGASCAR  AF  10.8
EGYPT,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  10.9
KENYA  AF  11A
SENEGAL  AF  115
COSTA  RICA  LA  11.6
ALGERIA  EMENA  11.7
CENTRAL  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC  AF  123
HAITI  CR  12.3
NEW ZEALAND  EA  13.0
GAMBIA,  THE  AF  13.3
MAURITANIA  AF  ISA
POLAND  EMENA  16.0
PORTUGAL  EMENA  16.3
SOUTH AFRICA  AP  17.4
YEMEN,  ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  17.9
GHANA  AF  19.4
LESOTHO  AP  19.754
COUNTRIES BY INFLATION
CmyReot  Iflaidon  (% p.aj)
ETHIOPIA  AF  20.6
SWAZILAND  AF  21.4
GREECE  EMMNA  23.0
JAMAICA  CR  23.2
COLOMBIA  LA  23.6
ECUADOR  LA  24.7
PARAGUAY  LA  24.9
SYRIAN  ARAB  REPUBLIC  EMEMA  254
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  CR  27.0
GUATEMALA  LA  29.9
TANZANIA  AF  30.7
EL SALVADOR  LA  31.3
SOMALIA  AF  32.9
ZAIRE  AF  34.7
ICELAND  IND  37.5
TURKEY  EMENA  44.1
ZAMBIA  AF  47.8
MEXaCO  LA  60.6
SUDAN  AF  64.6
SIERRA  LEONE  AP  69.7
URUGUAY  LA  76.8
YUGOSLAVIA  EMENA  79.7
UGANDA  AF  122.5
PERU  LA  169.2
ISRAEL  EMENA  205.
BRAZIL  LA  234.7
ARGENTINA  LA  452.455
COUNTRIES BY WEIGHTED REAL RETURN
CouMy  REGION  Veighted Real Retum  (% p.&)
UGANDA  AF  -53.9
PERU  LA  -40.0
SIERRA LEONE  AF  -38.9
SUDAN  AF  -37.0
ZAMBIA  AF  -27.5
ZAIRE  AF  -23.7
SOMALIA  AF  -22.5
TANZANIA  AF  -22.5
ARGENTINA  LA  -21.6
SYRLAN  ARAB REPUBLIC  EMENA  -19.5
YUGOSLAVIA  EMENA  -19.2
EL SALVADOR  LA  -19.0
GUATEMALA  LA  -18.6
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  CR  -16.8
ICELAND  IND  -16.2
ETiHIOPIA  AF  -15.3
ECUADOR  LA  -14.1
GHANA  AF  -13.9
PARAGUAY  LA  -13.5
YEMEN, ARAB  REPUBLIC  OF  EMENA  -13.5
ME)aCO  LA  -12.5
MAURITANIA  AF  -12.4
POLAND  EMENA  -11.5
LESOrHO  AF  -11.4
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  AF  -10.5
ALGERIA  EMENA  -9.7
TURKEY  EMENA  -8.6
GREECE  EMENA  -8.5
GAMBIA, THE  AF  -8.3
SWAZILAND  AF  -8.3
SENEGAL  AF  -7.9
JAMAICA  CR  -7.1
CHINA  EA  -6.1
EGYPT,  ARAB  REPUBUC OF  EMENA  -5.8
MOROCCO  EMENA  -5.6
MALI  AF  -5.6
HAITI  CR  -5.4
NEPAL  SA  -5.2
MADAGASCAR  AF  -5.1
SOUTH AFRICA  AF  -4.8
HUNGARY  EMENA  4.8
TUNISIA  EMENA  4.7
URUGUAY  LA  -4.5
GABON  AF  4.2
COLOMBIA  LA  -3.856
COUNTRIES BY WEIGHTED REAL RETURN
Counlq  REGION  VeJgtd  Real Retum  (% p.a)
FIJI  EA  -3.6
KENYA  AF  -3.6
PAKISTAN  SA  -3.1
ITALY  IND  -3.1
SOLOMON ISLANDS  EA  -3.0
INDIA  SA  -3.0
BANGLADESH  SA  -2.9
MALAWI  AF  -2.5
BENIN  AF  -2.3
BURMA  SA  -2.2
NORWAY  IND  -2.0
COSTA RICA  LA  -2.0
BOTSWANA  AF  -1.8
TRNIDAD  AND TOBAGO  CR  -1.8
COTE IYIVOIRE,  REPUBLIC  OF  AF  -1.8
SPAIN  EMENA  -0.9
TOGO  AF  -0.5
NEW ZEALAND  EA  -0.3
FRANCE  IND  -0.2
DOMINICA  CR  0.0
AUSTRALIA  IND  0.0
ZIMBABWE  AF  0.2
CYPRUS  EMENA  0.2
BELGIUM  IND  O04
SWITZERLAND  IND  0.4
VENEZUELA  LA  0.5
CONGO, PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  AF  0.5
CHAD  AF  0.6
AUSTRIA  IND  0.6
BAHAMAS  CR  0.6
IRELAND)  EMENA  0.7
DENMARK  IND  0.7
UNITED KINGDOM  IND  0.7
WESTERN SAMOA  EA  1.2
JAPAN  IND  1.3
NETHERLANDS  IND  1.3
MAURlTlUS  AF  1.4
BARBADOS  CR  1.4
NIGER  AF  1.5
GERMANY, FEDERAL  REPUBLIC  IND  1.7
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  EA  1.8
ST. CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS  CR  1.8
HONDURAS  LA  1.9
MALTA  EMENA  2.1
BURKINA FASO  AF  2.157
COUNTRIES  BY  WEIGHTED  REAL  RETURN
cmby  REGION Yelghted  Real  Retumn  (%  p)
BRAZIL  LA  2.1
SWEDEN  IND  2.3
FINLAND  IND  2.4
CAMEROON  AF  2.6
JORDAN  EMENA  2.6
CANADA  IND  2.8
UNITED  STATES  IND  2.9
GRENADA  CR  3.2
ST.  VINCENT  & THE GRENADINES  CR  3.4
SINGAPORE  EA  3.6
PORTUGAL  EMENA  3.8
SURINAME  LA  3.8
NIGERIA  AF  4.3
SEYCHELLES  AF  4.4-
KOREA,  REPUBLIC  OF  EA  4.5
VANUATU  EA  4.8
INDONESIA  EA  4.9
RWANDA  AF  5.0
ST. LUCIA  CR  5.7
ANTIGUA  AND BARBUDA  CR  6.6
THAILAND  EA  7.4
MALAYSIA  EA  7.4
BELIZE  LA  7.5
BURUNDI  AF  7.6
PHILIPPINES  EA  9.2
SRI  LANKA  SA  11.1
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